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The eminent French biologist and historian of biology François Jacob once notoriously 
declared, “On n’interroge plus la vie dans les laboratoires” (Jacob, La logique du vivant, 
discussed in Canguilhem’s review, “Logique du vivant et histoire de la biologie,” Sciences 71 
(1971): 20-25): laboratory research no longer inquires into the notion of ‘Life’. In the mid-
twentieth century, from the immediate post-war period to the late 1960s, French philosophers 
of science such as Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon returned to 
Jacob’s statement with an odd kind of pathos: they were determined to reverse course. Not by 
imposing a different kind of research program in laboratories, but by an unusual combination 
of historical and philosophical inquiry into the foundations of the life sciences (particularly 
medicine, physiology and proto-‘biology’) – a project that at the time was termed 
‘biophilosophy’, although this proved to be a short-lived term, as a kind of ‘alternate 
paradigm’ with respect to mainstream philosophy of biology, as Jean Gayon has noted. Even 





(1955), Canguilhem speaks oddly of “defending vitalist biology,” and declares that “la vie 
déconcerte la logique.” Was all this historical and philosophical work merely a reassertion of 
some ‘magical’ vitalism? Indeed, Canguilhem credits Bergson’s ‘thinking of life’ as well. In 
order to answer this question we need to achieve some perspective on Canguilhem’s 
‘vitalism’, notably with respect to its philosophical influences including a Bergsonian legacy, 
not least since Canguilhem was first an anti-vitalist, anti-Bergsonian, as Giuseppe Bianco has 
described, but then evolved into his own idiosyncratic brand of vitalism, in which life “is 
concept” (“Le concept et la vie,” 1968). Did this make Canguilhem more or less of a 




















 1. Biophilosophy and vitalism 
French biophilosophy in the 1950s-1960s means at least three names – Georges Canguilhem, 
Raymond Ruyer, and Gilbert Simondon; for reasons of space we focus on Canguilhem in this 
essay. Biophilosophy during its relatively brief tenure was a project distinctively different 
from Anglophone ‘philosophy of biology’. 2  Notably, it does not present philosophy as 
coming second in relation to a foundational or normative status of scientific practice. In this 
context we frequently encounter reference to Life, the thinking of Life, the meaning (sens) of 
Life, and of course the idea of a philosophy of Life, along with a focus on vitalism. Here, the 
influence of Bergson is non-negligible. 
These thinkers blend the historical and the normative when dealing with vitalistic 
themes in the conceptual foundations of the life sciences (‘biology’, natural history, medicine, 
etc.). This appears vividly in Canguilhem, who presents himself at least to all but close 
readers as a scholar, with a thèse d’État on the origins of reflex physiology – yet declares 
quite bluntly that he is a vitalist. Canguilhem often refers to vitalism in his work, going as far 
as describing himself as one in the Foreword of the above-mentioned work on reflex action: 
“Il nous importe peu d’être ou tenu pour vitaliste…”; he presents the book itself as a “defense 
of vitalist biology.”3 Additionally, some years earlier, he had devoted an article to the topic, 
“Aspects du vitalisme” (originally lectures at the Collège Philosophique in Paris, in 1946-
1947).
4
 Here, Canguilhem asserts from the outset that when the philosopher inquires into 
biological life, she has little to expect or gain from “a biology fascinated by the prestige of 
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the physicochemical sciences, reduced to the role of a satellite of these sciences.”5 In other 
words, the philosopher in this position is almost inexorably led to a vitalist positionnement.  
We are not the first to note that there is an unusual combination here of the historical 
and the normative, or the scholarly and the speculative. In a little-known but interesting book 
entitled La notion d’organisation dans l’histoire de la biologie (1978), which is marred by 
frequent polemical outbursts (these also contribute to rendering it interesting), Joseph Schiller 
targeted the historian of the life sciences Jacques Roger, Foucault, and Canguilhem as anti-
Cartesians who attempted a ‘vitalist’ revision of the history of science, so as to deemphasize 
the key role of Descartes in particular and the mechanistic ‘paradigm’ in general. Schiller 
opposes ‘good’ history of science, which he understands as being in agreement with what the 
scientists say, and thereby mechanistic, from Descartes to Bernard and beyond, to ‘bad’ 
history of science, which obeys certain philosophical imperatives, in this case vitalistic ones. 
As it turns out, Canguilhem explicitly reflects on the dual nature of vitalism as both 
historical object and conceptual stance, thus mirroring Schiller’s critique but also becoming a 
moving, self-aware target. Our main focus will be this dual nature of vitalism, as presented 
‘by’ but also ‘in’ Canguilhem, i.e., both according to his analyses and to his own 
philosophical performance. The historical side is unique to him, whereas the conceptual 
argument for thinking Life on particular terms – with the primacy of activity, and the 
devalorization of the paradigm of the machine – bears a strong Bergsonian imprint.  
Canguilhem shared the idea with Bergson of pursuing a biological philosophy in 
which life and knowledge would be united.
6
 In fact, there is a continuity from Bergson to 
Canguilhem in their shared emphasis on the “meaning” (sens) of life. But it is also “the 
meaning of life” that distinguishes Canguilhem from Bergson. For Bergson, metaphysics and 
science comprise two different types of knowledge of reality and they have developed 
respectively with their particular approaches, namely intuition and intelligence. Intuition is a 
method to enter into the duration of life, while intelligence is an approach to the science of 
matter. In metaphysics the meaning of life is found by intuition, while in science it is found 
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by intelligence. For Canguilhem, the meaning of life is a “counterintuitive” knowledge which 
has nothing to do with the constitution of knowledge by means of philosophical intuition.
7
 
The point is not to attribute the meaning of life to metaphysics rather than to science. Instead,  
in Canguilhem’s words, “Philosophy should not begin at the place where science terminates, 
because science in its own manner is already a philosophy.”8 
Canguilhem carried on the Bergsonian objective in his project of a biophilosophy: 
“philosophy should create a new perspective, faced with the vital fact.”9 The project aims to 
introduce a philosophical, “vital perspective” on life, instead of the reductionist project of 
reducing life to matter. Since the tradition of biological philosophy had been totally neglected 
from Descartes to Sartre,
10
 Bergson’s philosophy of life, with L’évolution créatrice in 1907, 
was a challenge to the French philosophical tradition.
11
 In fact, “the oblivion of life” in 
French philosophy existed for a long time. Firstly, it can be traced back to the rationalism of 
Cartesian mechanism and its “mistrust and hostility” towards life (whether or not this is a fair 
assessment of Cartesian physiology), by assimilating living beings to mechanical and 
material objects.
12
 The nature of life is not granted any metaphysical originality when life is 
completely analyzed by reason and in matter. Secondly, existentialism eliminated the 
biological aspect of human life from the notion of existence. Life is defined there in a rational 
form, as a pure “existence” attributed to the condition of human beings alone, not to all living 
beings. In Descartes, “in the philosophies of Alain, Brunschvicg and Sartre, life is not 
recognized as a proper metaphysical object.”13 Canguilhem makes use of the same opposition 
in a later essay on ‘environment’ in biology, where he opposes the restrictive, Cartesian view 
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of animal motion (this time as presented in behaviorism) to a richer understanding of motion 
and perception, in Gestalt theory and von Uexküll’s ethology.14 Canguilhem’s desire to 
present a unified picture of life and knowledge sometimes has surprisingly humanist 
overtones, as when he opposes Life to technology and the various forms of the 
“mechanization of life,” and speaks of human biology and medicine as belonging to an 
“anthropology”; by extension, “medical vitalism” is the expression of an “instinctive 
suspicion toward the power of technology over life.”15 
 In his desire to ‘roll back’ some of this denial of a metaphysics of life, Canguilhem is 
then a vitalist, indeed, a self-proclaimed one. But what sort of vitalist was he, and what role 




2. Historical epistemology of life or metaphysical vitalism? 
Unlike Bergson, Canguilhem does not begin with a metaphysical assertion of the 
uniqueness of Life. He often acts as the historical epistemologist, seeking to defuse some of 
the reductionist challenges to vitalism by problematizing it as an historical object. Yet at the 
same time, even if he wears the mask of the scholar, looking at the construction of a concept 
(say, the cell theory), Canguilhem the philosopher asks highly ‘motivated’ questions of 
science, in a manner which probably owes a great deal to Bachelard, precisely in the context 
of a historical epistemology: “A philosophy which looks to science for the clarification of 
concepts cannot disregard the construction of science”; “Truth is not constituted in a history 
of truth but in a history of science, in the experience of science”; “the pursuit of truth is the 
effect of a choice which does not exclude its opposite.”17 The history of science has to study 
possible conceptual developments rather than just invalidate the past (the error of 
‘presentism’). What this entails for vitalism is that it has a specifically philosophical place, 
whether it is scientifically ‘validated’ or ‘refuted’, and apart from its status as a scientific 
‘construction’. 
In this sense, as Canguilhem suggests, vitalism is not like geocentrism or phlogiston: 
it is not refutable in quite the same way.
18
 Vitalism is generally considered to have been 
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‘refuted’ twice. First, according to a celebrated scientific tale, with Friedrich Wöhler’s 
synthesis of urea in 1828, which showed that organic substances can be produced out of 
inorganic compounds, thus rendering the claim that the chemistry of the living body is 
categorically distinct from that of inanimate bodies, invalid. Second, a century later, this time 
because of physics, in early twentieth-century Vienna Circle arguments against Hans Driesch 
and Bergson, in the name of the causal closure of the space-time world (given the causal 
closure that physics reveals in the world, how could there be an immaterial vital impulse 
force, entelechy or élan vital which causes events in this world without itself being caused?)
19
 
In both cases, a form of vitalism may be refuted, but not what Canguilhem has in mind. The 
undead character of vitalism appears in the first case, with Wöhler’s synthesis of urea, when 
people start to describe the purported refutation as a “chemical legend” (including because 
the synthesis was actually only performed by Berthelot later on, and chemists like Berzelius 
continued to speak of vital forces afterwards
20
); in the second case, substantival vitalism is 
refuted, not what we might call explanatory or heuristic vitalism. 
So not only is vitalism a unique kind of historical object; much more metaphysically, 
it is Life itself which dictates a certain kind of attitude on the part of the inquirer. There is 
something about Life that places the knower in a special relation to it. Indeed Canguilhem 
frequently makes an overtly metaphysical, ahistorical claim that the living animal is 
necessarily a knower, so that conversely, the nature of Life itself forces the knower to 
approach it in a certain way (with echoes of the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics). In the 
1966 essay “Le concept et la vie,” one of Canguilhem’s most difficult and ambitious pieces, 
which deliberately indulges in high metaphysics, he begins by reflecting on Aristotle, 
declaring that the thinker is interested in Life insofar as it is “the form and potential of the 
living.”21 Foucault emphasizes the same point in his fine essay on Canguilhem: “To form 
concepts is a way of living, not of killing life.”22 This is also true at the historical level, for 
Canguilhem describes Life itself as transcending the oppositions familiar to historians of 
science: “The opposition between Mechanism and Vitalism, or Preformationism and 
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Epigenesis, is transcended by life itself, extending itself [se prolongeant] as a theory of life” 
(“Aspects du vitalisme,” 85). Of course, if vitalism and mechanism are simply the two poles 
of the activity of Life and its interpretation, why should vitalism be any better than 
mechanism? We will not attempt to answer this question now, as we mainly want to 
emphasize that Canguilhem is operating with an extremely robust, one might even say 
overdetermined concept of Life. 
 
 3. Organology, mechanism and Life 
 Reflecting on the “situation of biological philosophy in France” in 1947, 23 
Canguilhem speaks of “the value of Bergsonian philosophy” in its contribution to French 
philosophy: 
for understanding the true relationship of organism and that of mechanism, for being a 
biological philosophy of machinism, treating machines as the organs of life, and 




This “biological philosophy of machinism” aims to integrate machine and organism, biology 
and technology. In other words, this biological philosophy or organology should be more 
fundamental than the world of machines or technology itself, again in a ‘push-back’ against 
the sovereignty of Cartesian mechanism, in which the organism was understood on the model 
of the automaton, explaining its structure and function “on the basis of the structure and 
function of an already-constructed machine.”25 The ideal type of the machine has become a 
proof of the self-sufficiency of mechanism. By contrast, Canguilhem reverses the priority of 
machine over organism in mechanism: “biological organization must necessarily precede the 
existence and meaning of mechanical constructions.”26  
Bergson criticizes mechanism in Creative Evolution for its construction of an artificial 
system in which life is treated as no different from inert matter. But life is also a sort of 
mechanics, in its technical character, which is irreducible to anything else. There is “a 
mechanics of transformation” in organic activity that cannot be mathematically developed as 
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The philosophy of Creative Evolution appears to us like the most clairvoyant (if not 
totally successful) attempt to complete the explanation of the mechanisms, including 
the mechanisms of life – which belongs to science – with a comprehension of the 
construction of machines taken as cultural rather than just physical facts, which 





For Canguilhem, all of mechanics essentially retains a vital origin which is irreducible to any 
rational forms. This vital dimension is, additionally, part of a broader embeddedness of 
mechanisms in cultural and organic activity (here Canguilhem echoes much of contemporary 
cognitive archaeology): the machine is “a fact of culture.” 29  If mechanical invention is 
derived from the origin of life, the machine is a cultural exemplar which is inseparable from 
the organization of life.
30
 
This is where the Bergsonian motif of an “organology” comes in: the project “to 
inscribe the mechanical within the organic,”31 “to return mechanism to its place in life and for 
life” and “to reinsert the history of mechanism into the history of life.”32 The organization of 
matter is attributed to an act of the élan vital insofar as the act of intelligence on matter also 
belongs to an organic activity. Recall Canguilhem’s Bergson-nourished attitude towards the 
Cartesian notion of animal-machines: he views them on the one hand as inadequate 
representations of organisms, but on the other hand, as the ruse of reason (!), as a form of 
skill, referring back to the original term μηχανή. As such, he considers that mechanistic 
representations are subsumable once again under the category of Life and its productions, i.e., 
as modalities of the organic world.
33
  
What troubles Bergson in mechanism is a “mechanistic idea of matter” that treats life 
as inert matter in a closed and artificial system. To this repetitive picture of matter he opposes 
its transformation by the élan vital in organization, generating the distinction between 
organized matter and unorganized matter. The élan vital distinguishes Bergsonian from 
classical vitalism.
34
 The latter is nothing other than “a sort of label affixed to our ignorance” 
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about the irreducibility of life, while mechanism “invites us to ignore that ignorance.”35 In 
fact, the debate between vitalism and mechanism ultimately becomes a question of the 
compatibility between life and knowledge. Mechanism is a rationalistic idea according to 
which “there exists a fundamental conflict between knowledge and life, such that their 
reciprocal aversion can lead only to the destruction of life by knowledge or to the derision of 
knowledge by life.” 36  By contrast, for Bergson and Canguilhem, there is an interaction 
between life and knowledge.  
 
4. Forms of vitalism: Bergson and Canguilhem 
 
Canguilhem’s identification of life with knowledge can be seen as echoing Bergson’s 
project of constituting knowledge in the reciprocal dynamic between “theory of life” and 
“theory of knowledge”; but in Bergson this reciprocity does not lead towards the concept of 
life, since there is a break that cannot be reconciled by the intellect between “life explained” 
and “life experienced” 37: this marks an important difference between the two thinkers, and 
their two forms of vitalism. Conceptual knowledge, which is dedicated “to thinking matter,” 
has a “natural inability to comprehend life.”38 The concept is incompatible with life, and by 
extension, a philosophy of the concept is not united with a philosophy of life. Canguilhem 
comments, 
It is evident that a philosophy of life conceived in this way cannot be a 
philosophy of the concept, since the genesis of living forms is not a completed 




Bergson sees concepts as tools employed by life in its relation to the environment.
 
But these 
conceptual tools – unlike Canguilhem’s more ‘Aristotelian’ emphasis on a concept:life 
continuity, discussed below – are incapable of exploring the durational movement of life 
because it is molded by intelligence on an immobile matter. Nevertheless, intuition can renew 
the concept once the intellect attends to the creation of life without returning to the natural 
intellectual habit of generalization. The intuitive concept is vitalized by intuition, rendering it 
                                                                                                                                                        
functional and existential forms of vitalism, see Charles Wolfe, “From substantival to functional vitalism and 
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susceptible to duration, and thereby articulating the meaning of life in relation to the 
experience of duration.
40
 Intuition is always prior to the concept and generates it as such. 
The intuition of life contradicts the pure intellectual practice of generalization of 
concepts: this is Bergsonian ‘intuitionism’.41 However, Bergson also attributes the origin and 
value of general ideas to “the fundamental requirements of life” that determine the vital 
significance of the faculty of generalization.
42
 As Canguilhem notes, Bergson grants “the 
essential resemblances or objective generalities which are inherent in reality itself.”43 These 
natural general ideas are generated from all types of organisms, and are distinct from the 
artificial ones fabricated by the human mind:  
every living being, perhaps even every organ, every tissue of a living being 
generalizes, I mean classifies, since it knows how to gather, in its environment, 
from the most widely differing substances or objects, the parts or elements 
which can satisfy this or that of its needs; the rest it disregards. Therefore it 
isolates the characteristic which interests it, going straight to a common 





Generalization is a biological function of the organism. All living beings generalize in their 
living world: their generalizing activities are biological in essence. 
In Canguilhem’s view, the linkage of conceptual knowledge to life could be 
alternatively developed with a Bergsonian inspiration, since the conceptual activity of a 
living being in its living context is generated from the act of biological generalization. 
Bergson’s vitalism is less concept-friendly, more suspicious of the transformation of life that 
occurs in and through the intellect. In contrast, for Canguilhem “life is concept.”45 This is so 
in at least three ways: in his focus on conceptual activity, on biological knowledge (“vitalism 
ultimately means the recognition of life as an original realm of phenomena, and thus the 
recognition of the specificity of biological knowledge”46), and on vitalism as a kind of 
fundamental existential attitude, “immanent in living beings”: 
Vitalism expresses a permanent requirement [exigence] of life in living beings, 
the self-identity of life which is immanent in living beings. This explains why 
mechanistic biologists and rationalist philosophers criticize vitalism for being 
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nebulous and vague. It is normal, if vitalism is primarily a requirement, that it 




He also calls it an “ethics,” again using the term “exigence”: vitalism is “more a requirement 
than a method, an ethics rather than a theory.”48 For Canguilhem, the concept is an emanation 
or outgrowth of a more fundamental vital activity, neither abstract generalization nor mere 
“determination,” more an ethics than a theory. The living being is a “center of reference” 
radiating activity outwards, including conceptual activity: 
The living is precisely a center of reference. It is not because I am thinking, it 
is not because I am a subject in a transcendental sense; it is because I am alive 




Canguilhem also refers with a hint of irony to Hegel’s imprudent leap away from Kant 
– from a deliberately regulative, projective vision of life (organism) to a ‘rational 
metaphysics’ or, in Canguilhem’s terms, an explicit identification of  concept and life: “Hegel 
accepted what Kant refused to accept. In the Phenomenology as well as in the Jena Real-
philosophie... Concept and Life are identified with each other.” 50  And yet, at times 
Canguilhem appears to side with Aristotle (whom he enthusiastically describes as the first to 
understand concept and life together) and Hegel rather than with this regulative, non-
metaphysical view. We should really distinguish between a Bergsonian, intuition-based 
vitalism – which as we have seen, Canguilhem credits for awakening French rationalism and 
existentialism from their combined dogmatic slumbers –, a more regulative, heuristic vitalism 
in which Life is more of a construct, and thirdly, a ‘conceptualist’ vitalism, in which concept 
and life are one, or at least unified. 
Canguilhem’s identification of concept and life is indeed Bergsonian-tinted, yet it is, 
not just more intellectualist (‘concept-friendly’) but also more naturalistic in the sense that it 
does not seek to be more fundamental than the conceptual activity of biological science itself 
(although this naturalism has to be taken with a grain of salt, as we discuss in closing). Take 
the example of genetics: it is “an anti-Bergsonian science” because it clings to “the belief in 
the stability of the structures produced by generation” in contrast to the Bergsonian forms of 
living being produced by the élan vital. Life is élan and the biological heredity in the 
formation of living forms is “the transmission of the élan”: to overcome the obstacle of 
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matter which divides, diversifies, disperses and multiplies the élan of life for the 
individualization of living forms. Finally, the obstacle to the élan is the élan itself when the 
élan becomes a limit for its self-overcoming in its transmission.
51
 
By contrast, the account given by genetics for “the formation of living forms by 
material presence” is “information.” It explains how the biological function of heredity is 
compared to a transmission of information in which the sense of life is identified as “a logos, 
inscribed, conserved and transmitted” in living matter. Canguilhem allows for “an a priori 
that is properly material and no longer just formal”52: this is far removed from the Bergsonian 
hostility to matter as the obstacle to the élan vital. 
  
 5. Concluding remarks 
 
Like Bergson, Canguilhem is not a substantival vitalist asserting the existence of 
special vital forces. Instead, he focuses on the relation between concept and life, additionally 
bringing out an ‘existential’, constructive dimension of vitalism as a requirement or demand 
(exigence) expressed by living beings.
53
 Canguilhem is furthest from Bergson in the way he 
historicizes the issue. Recall his suggestion that vitalism is not like (the theory of) phlogiston 
or geocentrism. This can be the case for two different reasons:  
— it’s not like phlogiston because it’s true and thus one’s ontology needs to include it 
(an ontological claim, which can be explicated in Aristotelian, Hegelian, Bergsonian 
or even Drieschian ways); 
— it’s not like phlogiston because it has this heuristic value, or explanatory power (a 




In fact, it’s not entirely clear where Canguilhem falls in this divide. However, his comments 
on vitalism as an “orientation” (what we have called an attitude) tend towards the latter 
interpretation. Indeed, it is clear that as an épistémologue he is careful to distinguish his 
claims from the more inflated ones of substantival vitalism. We seem to be far from a 
                                                 
51
 “ Le concept et la vie,” 339, 353. 
52
 “ Le concept et la vie,” 339, 362. 
53
 “Aspects du vitalisme,” 86. 
54
 One of Canguilhem’s students, Dominique Lecourt, confuses this heuristic dimension with ontological 
vitalism: “The assertion of ... ‘vitalism’ as an intellectual requirement which aims to acknowledge the originality 
of Life, entirely retains its significance today, when the combination of a type of biochemical materialism and a 
type of mathematical formalism tend to deny this originality of Life, the better to neuronalize thought” (“La 
question de l’individu d’après Canguilhem,” in Georges Canguilhem. Philosophe, historien des sciences, edited 
by E. Balibar, D. Lecourt et al. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), 269). In contrast, in his earlier work Lecourt had 
judged Canguilhem’s vitalist tendencies severely – they were the part of his thought that the Marxist interpreter 
should not keep (Marxism and epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault, trans. B. Brewster (1972; 
London: NLB, 1975). 
13 
 
metaphysics of Life, then. Yet the concept-and-life side of Canguilhem (“life is concept”), 
but also the side in which historico-scientific formations like ‘mechanism’ express an aspect 
of a deeper level called ‘Life’, point to a different moral of the story – not a safe piece of 
historical epistemology. 
If Canguilhem’s vitalism is not an ontological commitment to the existence of vital 
forces, and at times explicitly recognizes the irreducibility of historico-instrumental forms of 
grasping ‘life science’, how can it be a metaphysics? What is “this vitalist confidence in the 
spontaneity of life”55? In a very real sense one cannot distinguish between a historical claim 
and a philosophical claim in Canguilhem’s ‘history of vitalism’ or ‘vitalism’. To put it in the 
form of a slogan (which concludes “Le concept et la vie”): “Contemporary biology, read in a 
certain way, is somehow a philosophy of life.”56 But the strongest claim of all is that Life 
itself is a positing of norms. Canguilhem’s recurring Nietzschean point, that what it is to be 
alive rather than a crystal or mineral is to be capable of error, or conversely, that life could be 
the result of an error, must be understood in support of his more general claim that norms are 
derived from vital activity itself. A vital error is something like an anomaly, which is why the 
history of biological thought always includes the problem of monsters: “If life has any 
meaning, we have to admit the possibility of a loss of meaning, of aberrations and 
misdeals.”57 Hence, as Canguilhem often says, there are no monstrous crystals, nor monstrous 
machines. 
Canguilhem’s revisionary project to put the life sciences at center stage in the history 
of science overall (traditionally dominated by the hard sciences) is bound up with strong 
ontological commitments, and a certain conceptual vagueness to boot. Namely, his project 
must amount to a claim regarding the specificity of its object, but it is not easy to make out 
exactly which claim he wants to make: 
— Life itself as an object is ontologically unique, including in its anomalousness; 
— living entities are meaningful and meaning-producing entities and thus have to be 
understood as such (this covers both the existential and the Goldsteinian aspects of his 
claim). 
Of course, both of these can be coherently regrouped under the heading of a medical vitalism, 
in which “the problem of the specificity of disease and the threshold it marks among natural 
beings” marks a kind of challenge to the integration of the objects of the life sciences within 
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the sciences in general; “the possibility of disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly and error” 
(Foucault).
58
 Yet Canguilhem’s vagueness appears, e.g., when he denies that vitalism is a 
metaphysics, and then adds immediately afterwards that it is “the recognition of the 
originality of the fact of life [le fait vital].”59 
We shall close with a brief consideration of a particularly difficult passage in 
“Aspects du vitalisme,” where Canguilhem rejects substantival vitalism more clearly than 
anywhere else: 
the classical vitalist grants that living beings belong to a physical environment, 
yet asserts that they are an exception to physical laws. This is the inexcusable 
philosophical mistake, in my view. There can be no kingdom within a kingdom 
[empire dans un empire], or else there is no kingdom at all. There can only be 
one philosophy of empire, that which rejects division and imperialism. ... One 
cannot defend the originality of biological phenomena and by extension, of 
biology, by delimiting a zone of indeterminacy, dissidence or heresy within an 
overall physicochemical environment of motion and inertia. If we are to affirm 
the originality of the biological, it must be as a reign over the totality of 
experience, not over little islands of experience. Ultimately, classical vitalism 
is (paradoxically) too modest, in its reluctance to universalize its conception of 
experience (95, emphasis ours). 
 
‘Classical’ vitalism as described here is substantival vitalism. And Canguilhem’s diagnosis of 
an “inexcusable philosophical mistake” is clear enough. But what should we make then of his 
defense of the “originality of the biology,” i.e. the autonomy of biology, as a “reign over the 
totality of experience”? What looks at first glance like metaphysical holism might instead be 
an ‘attitudinal’ conception, that is, a point of view on experience.  
 Unlike the “classical vitalist,” Canguilhem insists, using Spinoza’s phrase, that we are 
not an imperium in imperio! That is, the laws of the physical world fully apply to all living 
beings, humans included, without exceptions. So all problems would appear to be solved … 
yet this statement creates new problems. Granted, to the standard question, how can one be a 
vitalist and reject any imperium in imperio?, we can answer on Canguilhem’s behalf that one 
can be a constructivist or heuristic vitalist; but what do we do then with the talk of ‘Life 
itself’? Similarly, if we grant that the ‘Aristotelian’ dimension in his vitalism – the stress on 
how Life itself creates a certain attitude on the part of the knower – is not to be confused with 
an appeal to substantival vital forces, we are left with the rather opaque invocation in the 
above quotation of “experience.” This may sound mysterious, unless we recall both 
Canguilhem’s Bergsonian background, and his conceptually oriented nuance. 
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